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related in Absalom, Absalom! hinges at several crucial 
points on the occurrence of incredibly unlikely 
coincidences. The ironic justice distinguishable in many of 
the events in The Sound and the Fury (although it exists 
concurrently, as one might expect of Faulkner, with much 
ironic injustice) does suggest, as Hunt observes, "a moral 
order of some kind, an order, Christian in many aspects, of 
retribution and compensation."'" And a curious prophecy is 
fulfilled in As ILay Dying. Cora recalls that Addie had said 
of Jewel, "He is my cross and he will be my salvation. He 
will save me from the water and from the fire. Even though 
I have laid down my life he will save me."20 Jewel literally 
discharges the terms of this cryptic and unlikely-sounding 
prediction in rescuing Addie's rotting corpse first from the 
flooded Yoknapatawpha River and later from Gillespie's 
blazing barn. Darl seems to have inherited Addie's 
prescient abilities. Rossky notes that 
Darl is the seer; his vision is beyond time - the largest 
in the book. Faulkner himself remarks that Darl, 
though mad, may "see more than the sane man," and 
repeatedly the novel confirms this view of Darl. 
Although he is not present, he can see Addie's death, 
and his vision is authenticated by Peabody's account; 
he knows Dewey Dell's secret and Jewel's true 
parentage. As Tull says: "It's like he had got into the 
inside of you, someway. Like somehow you was looking 
at yourself and your doings outen his eyes.""' 
While this capitalizing on prophecy or coincidence may 
in some instances suggest merely that certain ofFaulkner's 
characters believe in an innate oneness of being and 
experience rather than in any Divine intervention in 
human affairs, it is only Faulkner's more Christian 
characters, whether sympathetically or ironically 
portrayed, who believe in such a unity; his atheists do not. 
And in many ways Faulkner antithetically suggests that 
his fictional universe is not only whole and ordered but also 
fragmented and chaotic - at least in the eyes of those 
characters who lack faith. Faulkner is as relativistic here 
as in his implications concerning the nature of God; the 
world appears disjointed to those who do not believe it is 
unified, and it appears as one to those who do, just as there 
is no God for those whose faith is absent, while a God exists 
for those who think He does and intervenes in the lives of 
those who think He would in the ways they think He 
should. 
"'Hunt, p. 82. 
20Faulkner,As I Lay Dying, p. 160. 
"1Rossky, p. 87. Robert Hemenway also discusses "Darl's 
clairvoyance" in "Enigmas of Being in As I Lay Dying," 
Modern Fiction Studies, XVI (Summer, 1970), 138. 
TERMINAL GENIUS: 
DIMENSIONS OF SUFFERING IN DIE LEIDEN DES JUNGEN WERTHER 
JOHN S. PUSTEJOVSKY 
University of Texas at Austin 
It is difficult to imagine someone who would not like a 
character like Werther. He is young, talented, highly 
imaginative, and artistically inclined. He is generous, 
sensitive, and, above all, warm-hearted. For decades after 
the publication of the novel, Goethe was plagued by readers 
anxious to know about the "real" Werther. He was 
immediately, and after two hundred years still is, 
"sympatisch". Recent Werther scholarship has done much 
to illuminate the reasons for Werther's unhappiness and 
suicide. Klaus Scherpe saw in his sufferings the indicators 
of a new consciousness emerging against the restrictive 
blandness of bourgeois society.' More recently Ignace 
Feuerlicht has forged them into a plausible psychological 
disorder, which can be seen as ending necessarily in 
self-destruction.2 But such contentions ignore or downplay 
significant ironic features of the work. Dirk van M aelsaeke 
admits there are ironic elements, and, agreeing with Welz, 
says this indicates Goethe's need to justify his own 
conformity to social and political realities in Weimar. 
Werther's "crime" is non-conformity, and the novel's later 
version signals Goethe's return to "the reactionary outlook 
of the late Enlightenment."3 
I would like to consider some of Werther's seemingly 
innocuous character traits as they betray a plain concern 
with the problem of achieving immediacy of expression and 
experience. Reading the novel for signs of this concern, one 
discerns an ironic mind at work in its construction, and 
arrives at an interpretation relevant to other works of 
Goethe. Rather than revealing a discontinuity in the 
author's sympathies with his character, which van 
Maelsaeke finds expressed as self-contradiction in 
Dichtung und Wahrheit,4 this ironic reading suggests that 
Goethe's position changed very little, if at all, over the 
years. 
It is difficult to say what Werther's real talent is. His 
mother wants him to become a civil servant; he is talented 
as a painter as well. But his real genius is the power of 
passionate sympathy. He is able immediately to fathom 
persons and circumstances which flatter and cajole his 
driving desire to experience nature without mediation, to 
permeate his own life and surroundings with the meaning 
of more substantial experiences. His first letter to Wilhelm 
demonstrates a concern for larger problems. He sees that a 
good deal of human suffering is caused by lingering over 
past misfortunes (May 4, 1771). Through his observation of 
nature he achieves a feeling of the presence of the 
omnipotent God. But despite the intensity of the 
experience, and his real need to recreate it in words, he is 
unable to do so. He very often interrupts his own thoughts 
with an exclamation of his frustration at his inability to 
convey to his friend that in which he so naturally and 
passionately participates. 
This feature of his story is significant, for it is primarily 
in language, specifically in poetry, that Werther seeks 
adequate resonance for his phenomenal sympathies. He 
writes that Homer is, to his "unbalanced, unsteady heart", 
"ein Wiegengesang" (May 13, 1771). Besides reading Greek 
poetry, Werther imaginatively transforms his 
surroundings into the patriarchal society of the Old 
Testament. For Herder, Greek and Hebrew, the language of 
the Old Testament, are more original languages. They are 
closer to the origins of language itself, and are thus closer to 
a genuine ontological origin. Thoughout the novel, 
Werther's longings find authority and precedence in the 
unmediated world of the ancient poets, in the world of 
Homer and Ossian. He believes in the fundamental power 
of the language of more primitive peoples to capture fully 
the substance, meanings, and passions of experience. 
Werther's talents as a painter are mentioned several 
times. One of his most satisfying experiences is painting 
the two young brothers before the barn (May 26, 1771). He 
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determines that in the future he will adhere only to nature. 
He later declares that poetry, too, must learn only from 
nature. The creativity he seeks is fundamental: 
Ach kinntest du das wieder ausdruicken 
konntest du dem Papiere das einhauchen, 
was so voll, so warm in dir lebt. (May 10, 1771) 
It would then be a genuine inspiration, a creation ex nihilo 
through language, which finds its example in Scripture. 
Werther believes himself privileged to the insight that 
the business of satisfying human needs, with which men 
exhaust their energies, is ultimately pointless. Even so, he 
can be happy in the knowledge that he is free to shed this 
existence at will (May 26, 1771). Since for Werther the full 
significance of one's existence is not readily attainable 
through ordinary enterprises, he is hesitant to commit 
himself to a professional position. The smallest foreseeable 
difficulty is an excuse to defer a decision. His observation of 
the lowest forms of animal life teaches him that nature's 
creatures are constantly at work against one another. After 
a short while in service in D-, he admits that this is equally 
true of human beings in society. In spite of his talents, he 
cannot make progress. The shifting hostilities and 
ambitions of those around him preclude any guarantee of 
success for just having made the effort. He lays the blame 
for his failure on others. 
Werther falls in love with Lotte because the 
purposefulness which he sees in her opens to him a healthy, 
unambiguous, seemingly fulfilled experience of life. In 
spite of his protestation that attention to human needs is 
ultimately pointless, Werther is utterly taken by Lotte 
when he sees her feeding - not herself-- but her siblings. 
What he imputes to her consciousness as she dances is what 
he himself longs for: 
Siehst Du, sie ist so mit ganzem Herzen und mit ganzer 
Seele dabei, ihr ganzer Korper eine Harmonie, so 
sorglos, so unbefangen, als wenn sie sonst nichts dabei 
dichte, nichts empfainde; und in dem Augenblicke 
gewiss schwindet alles ander vor ihr. (June 16, 1771) 
Her allusion to poetry, the tearful "Klopstock!" touches in 
Werther a sympathetic chord and releases a flood of ecstatic 
tears. According to Herder, this sympathetic effect is one 
characteristic of language in its primal state: the power to 
awaken in the hearer similar physical sensations. Poetry, 
for Herder and Werther, still possesses this power. "Diese 
Seufzer, diese T6ne sind Sprache: es gibt also eine Sprache 
der Empfindung, die unmittelbares Naturgesetz ist."5 
Lotte tells Werther that her favorite book is that in which 
she discovers her own world, itself not a paradise, but still a 
source of unspeakable happiness. This is ambiguous, but 
not for Werther, apparently. 
Werther's own language flatters his sympathetic genius. 
He dislikes being interrupted after launching into a 
rhetorical discourse, even though he has been accused 
before of using a disjointed logic. He can not suffer the 
constant qualification of a statement in spite of its 
apparent rectitude. In the letter of August 12, 1771, 
Werther writes to Wilhelm that Albert is guilty of this, 
continuing "bis zuletzt gar nicht mehr an der Sache ist." 
Likewise, it is the envoy's persistent, petty improvements 
to Werther's style which antagonize him. 
Albert sees in the story of the suicidal drowning the act of 
an ignorant, narrow mind, but for Werther this is an act of 
heroism. He deplores Albert's readiness to condemn such 
acts. Werther believes himself capable of discerning a 
different, more valid causality, and traces the girl's motives 
for himself. For Albert this is still not quite right, and 
Werther is upset. He has mistaken his powers of sympathy 
for understanding and reason. 
It is with great care that Werther relates the final 
episodes concerning the murderous farmhand, even though 
he is painfully, despairingly aware that he can not express 
it adequately. He hardly dares compare himself with this 
simple unfortunate. Here, as throughout the book, Werther 
does nothing more than take Herder at his word. He is 
admitting a greater intensity of experience among 
primitive peoples (who survive in the peasantry) and 
affirming a distance or "fallenness" from this primitive 
source. He thinks the fallenness is caused by a lacuna in 
himself. 
Werther stands before two possibilities: the first is that of 
action and the absolute uncertainty of achieving a lasting 
fulfillment; the second is that of passivity and the promise 
of immediacy through the effortless sympathies of poetry 
and his own genius. He suffers now because he discovers in 
nature and society an excess of experience which is 
incommensurate with his power to describe it. Early in the 
book he scoffs at his own desire to render his experiences in 
language: 
. .. doch was soll Dichtung, Szene und Idylle? muss es 
denn immer gebosselt sein, wenn wir teil an einer 
Naturerscheinung nehmen sollen? (May 30, 1771) 
Near the end (October 10, 1772) he amazingly relies on a 
simple dash to express his feelings about Albert. 
The sophistication of Werther's thought betrays itself in 
his awareness of his ruinous equivocation in this choice. 
Several times he laughs at his passion for Lotte, and also 
demystifies the futile attempt to experience nature in its 
immediacy (June 21, 1771). Unable to realize his longing 
for fulfillment with Lotte, unwilling to brave the 
uncertainty of decisive action, Werther remains in a state 
of psychic paralysis. He is not being driven to suicide, not 
even by himself; it will occur as the necessary consequence 
of believing that language in any form really does produce 
sympathetic sensations in others. When he realizes he has 
failed persistently to effect such sympathy through 
language, he believes himself incapable of eliciting 
sympathy at all. This is to him a sign that he can not 
survive: 
Ach die Liebe, Freude, Warme und Wonne, die ich 
nicht hinzubringe, wird mir der andere nicht geben, 
und mit einem ganzen Herzen voll Seligkeit werde ich 
den andern nicht beglticken, der kalt und kraftlos vor 
mir steht. (October 27, 1772) 
In the absence of certainty and unmediated fulness of 
being, suffering itself becomes a condition of intensified 
experience. It is the nearest and most affordable substitute 
'Klaus R. Scherpe, Werther und Wertherwirkung: Zum 
Syndrom biirgerlicher Gesellschaftsordnung im 18. Jahrhundert (Bad Homburg: Gehlen, 1970). 
2Ignace Feuerlicht, "Werther's Suicide: Instinct, 
Reasons, Defence," German Quarterly, LI, 4 (November, 
1978), 476-492. 
3Dirk van Maelsaeke, "Experimentelle Romane der 
Goethezeit: Der Weimarer Werther, Stendhals Le Rouge et le Noir und Tiecks William Lovell," Acta Germanica, X 
(1977), 220. 
4van Maelsaeke, p. 222. 
5Johann Gottfried Herder, "Abhandlung uiber den 
Ursprung der Sprache" in Johann Gottfried Herder: 
"Abhandlung iiber den Ursprung der Sprache." Texte, 
Materialien, Kommentar, ed. Wolfgang ProB (Miinchen: Hanser, 1978), p. 10. 
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for the unfounded faith required for blind action. Ossian 
serves this purpose well. In Werther's last meeting with 
Lotte, as in his first, ancient poetry touches an instinctive 
chord of sympathy in each of them. 
Goethe's own position on his character's problem is far 
from ambiguous. Werther has tried desperately to win 
access to unity and immediacy of being, and experiences 
only failure in his attempts to represent it. Werther shies 
away from action, but the two persons he admires most are 
paragons of self-overcoming energy. The narrative does 
begin with the decisive act of leaving his family and 
friends. But he abandons the dubious promise of fulfillment 
through deeds for the seductive promise of self-deluding 
presence. Passivity now means suffering. The point of 
departure for his self-destruction is the naive but decidedly 
conscious desire to believe that he will not be 
misunderstood. The final attempt to prove this correct is 
the act of suicide. That he should try to assert once and for 
all his freedom not to act through an act as decisive as 
suicide is indeed ironic. That even this act will not be an 
unqualified success is inevitable. The intended decisive 
character of the act is lessened by his failure to do a goodjob 
of killing himself. 
Werther is unaware that even Wilhelm might prove his 
early prediction that "missverstanden zu werden, ist das 
Schicksal von unsereinem" (May 17, 1771). Here the 
significance of the epistolary form becomes apparent. After 
his death, Werther's evocative, rhetorical language is 
assembled by an editor and made to say in spite of itself 
that Werther failed to be understood. 
Poor Werther has searched and failed to find the answer 
to the question: How do we achieve immediacy of being? If 
we read this novel as an irony, we find that Goethe's 
response was only a counter-question: Can we achieve such 
immediacy? Perhaps Goethe believed it possible, but it 
seems likely now that it must have been done in spite of, not 
by virtue of, the Werther in him. 
SENSE AND TRANSCENDENCE IN EMERSON, THOREAU, AND WHITMAN 
LARRY J. REYNOLDS AND TIBBIE E. LYNCH 
Texas A& M University 
American Transcendentalism was the most important 
intellectual movement to emerge in America in the 
mid-nineteenth century, and, as David Bowers pointed out 
some thirty years ago, "its vitalizing effect upon American 
art and literature and, indeed, upon the development of 
American democracy as a whole, remains unrivaled."' 
Because of the obvious importance of Transcendentalism, a 
multitude of scholars have written about its European and 
native sources, its cultural, social, and political effects, and 
its influence upon the writings of the five major writers of 
the American Renaissance, Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, 
Hawthorne, and Melville. Nevertheless, most of us will 
agree that the meaning of the term remains as elusive and 
problematic today as when it first gained circulation in 
America in the 1820's. One definitional difficulty arises, of 
course, from the inherent vagueness of the term itself. This 
was the obvious point of Hawthorne's satire in "The 
Celestial Railroad" when he portrayed the Giant 
Transcendentalist as a foggy, dusky miscreant having 
form, features, substance, and nature that "neither he for 
himself, nor anybody for him, has ever been able to 
describe."2 Another less obvious difficulty, noted by 
Charles R. Crowe, stems from the fact that "in a very true 
sense there were almost as many Transcendentalisms as 
there were Transcendentalists."''3 This brief essay does not 
presume to offer any new or final definition of 
Transcendentalism; however, it does attempt to add new 
clarity and particularity to its meaning through a close 
examination of three passages in the writings of America's 
three foremost Transcendentalists: Emerson, Thoreau, and 
Whitman. The focus will be on the famous "transparent 
eyeball" passage in Emerson's Nature, the "Sounds" 
chapter of Walden, and Section Five of "Song of Myself," 
each of which records a transcendental experience and 
reveals many of the distinguishing features of its author's 
individual brand of Transcendentalism. 
As is well known, Transcendentalism in America was 
inspired by dissatisfaction with the emotional and spiritual 
sterility of Unitarianism, a sterility attributed to the 
Unitarian acceptance of Lockean "sensationalism." In 
their attempt to renew the religious idealism of their own 
Puritan past, the American Transcendentalists turned to 
contemporary German philosophers, particularly Kant. As 
Emerson explained in his famous lecture "The 
Transcendentalist," "the Idealism of the present day 
acquired the name of Transcendental, from the use of that 
term by Immanuel Kant, of Konigsberg, who replied to the 
skeptical philosophy of Locke, which insisted that there 
was nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the 
experience of the senses, by showing that there was a very 
important class of ideas, or imperative forms, which did not 
come by experience, but through which experience was 
acquired; that these were intuitions of the mind itself; and 
he denominated them Transcendental forms."4 
While Emerson and others drew upon Kant's formal 
philosophy, particularly its distinction between intuitive 
Reason with a capital R and empirical understanding, their 
system of thought had at its foundation spiritual sentiment 
rather than logic. As F. I. Carpenter has observed, 
"American Transcendentalism was primarily religious 
rather than philosophical," and "when Andrews Norton 
attacked Emerson's 'Divinity School Address,' he justly 
compared its sentiment to the earlier mysticism and 
emotionalism of Edwards."" For Emerson, Thoreau, and 
Whitman, the act of intuitive perception resulted in a 
mystical spiritual union between the material world, 
which included the finite self, and the infinite ideal world; 
between, in Emerson's terms, the NOT ME and the ME, 
NATURE and SOUL. This mystical union formed the 
center of the Transcendentalisms of all three writers, for 
the ecstasy accompanying it provided experiential 
confirmation of the validity of their views of man and 
nature. For each writer the mystical union and the act of 
intuitive perception initiating it were unique. Turning now 
to the three selected passages, it is necessary to examine 
this uniqueness. 
What is most interesting in a comparison of the three 
selections is that in each, one of the five senses initiates the 
transcendental experience: for Emerson, sight; Thoreau, 
hearing; and Whitman, touch. Emerson's "transparent 
eyeball" passage appears in Part One of Nature and forms 
the climax of his introductory statements about the effect of 
natural objects upon the lover of nature, that is, upon one 
"whose inward and outward senses are still truly adjusted 
to each other." "In the woods," he writes, "we return to 
reason and faith. There I feel that nothing can befal me in 
